House of Commons, Written Questions

30 Nov 2000 : Column: 722W

Trident

Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what account his Department takes of the number of anti-ballistic missiles deployed by other countries when determining the number of warheads deployed on United Kingdom Trident submarines. [141158]

Mr. Hoon: I will write to my hon. Friend and a copy of my letter will be placed in the Library of the House.

House of Commons, Written Questions

30 Nov 2000 : Column: 838W

Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty

Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs for what reason it is his policy to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and how his Department intends to give effect to this policy. [141032]

Mr. Vaz: I will write to the hon. Member shortly and place a copy of the letter in the Libraries of the House.

Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for nationwide defence. [141033]

Mr. Vaz: I will write to the hon. Member shortly and place a copy of the letter in the Libraries of the House.

House of Lords, Written Questions

29 Nov 2000 : Column WA144

US National Missile Defence System: UK Facilities

Lord Moynihan asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether upgrades to radar stations in Yorkshire would be necessary for a United States National Missile Defence System; and, if so, what is their policy towards such upgrades.[HL4735]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I refer the noble Lord to the memorandum on these questions submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee's recent inquiry into Weapons of Mass Destruction. This can be found in the appendices to the committee's report, which was published on 2 August and is also available on the Internet (http://www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/fachome.htm.

As the Government have repeatedly made clear, any US request to use facilities in the UK for NMD purposes would be considered carefully in the light of the circumstances in which is was made.

House of Lords, Written Questions

29 Nov 2000 : Column WA147

US National Missile Defence System

Lord Moynihan asked Her Majesty's Government: What is their response to proposals for a United States National Missile Defence System.[HL4734]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: President Clinton announced on 1 September his decision not to authorise the deployment of such a system at the present time. It will now be for his successor to decide how to proceed. We look forward to engaging with the next US Administration on this and related issues in due course.

Lord Moynihan asked Her Majesty's Government: What discussions they have held with Russia regarding the United States proposals for a National Missile Defence System.[HL4736]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The Government has had numerous exchanges with Russia on this issue in recent months. Most recently, the Prime Minister discussed it with President Putin in Moscow on 21 November.

House of Commons, Written Questions

28 Nov 2000 : Column: 496W

National Missile Defence

Mr. Baker: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions have taken place between representatives of Her Majesty's Government and (a) George W. Bush and (b) Al Gore in respect of National Missile Defence; and if he will make a statement. [140310]

Mr. Hoon [holding answer 24 November 2000]: The Government have held regular discussions on the proposed US National Missile Defence system, and related issues, both with the current US Administration, including Vice President Gore, and with advisers to Governor Bush.

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Programme

Mr. Duncan Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his Department's contribution is to the NATO ballistic missile defence programme. [140017]

Mr. Hoon [holding answer 24 November 2000]: I refer the hon. Member to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow) on 27 November 2000, Official Report, column 417W.

House of Commons, Written Questions

27 Nov 2000 : Column: 418W

NATO Ballistic Missile Defence

Mr. Bercow: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his Department's contribution is to the NATO ballistic missile defence programme. [138610]

Mr. Hoon: NATO does not have a ballistic missile defence programme. The Ministry of Defence has, however, contributed to NATO studies on the subject, including preparations for studies into the feasibility of theatre ballistic missile defence. We expect the theatre ballistic missile defence feasibility studies to start next year.

House of Commons, Defence Oral Questions

27 Nov 2000 : Column 622

European Missile Defence

6. Mr. David Atkinson (Bournemouth, East): What recent discussions he has had with his Russian counterpart on European missile defence. [138576]

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): I have had no recent discussions with my Russian counterpart on European missile defence, but we regularly discuss ballistic missile defence during other consultations with the Russian Federation, and there has in recent months been discussion between NATO and Russia on the scope for co-operation on theatre missile defence and related issues. We want that dialogue to continue.

Mr. Atkinson: Does the Minister recall the offer that President Putin made to President Clinton last June for Russia to help to put into place a missile defence system for Europe? Did the Prime Minister discuss that offer with President Putin during his meetings with him in Moscow last week? Can he tell the House the nature and the source of the threat to Europe that could have motivated President Putin to make the offer in the first place?

Mr. Hoon: It is right to say that Russia has presented, at least in outline, a number of proposals on co-operation on ballistic missile defence involving Russia and NATO; it is however fair to say that the Russians have not yet set out any specific details of those proposals. When they do--we have encouraged them to do so--we and our NATO allies will consider them carefully, as the House would expect.

Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North): Does my right hon. Friend agree that the new United States Administration--whoever eventually wins--should take full account of both Russian and European concerns before taking any decision on national missile defence, and that they should pay heed to the report by our own Select Committee on Foreign Affairs?

Mr. Hoon: That is the position that the present US Administration have taken. We believe that it is an extremely responsible position; indeed, we have encouraged it.

House of Commons, Defence Oral Questions

27 Nov 2000 : Column 626

Nuclear Threat

10. Mr. Graham Brady (Altrincham and Sale, West): What his assessment is of the threat to the UK from nuclear weapons. [138581]

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): We assess that there is no significant threat to the United Kingdom from nuclear weapons at present, but we continue to monitor developments very closely.

Mr. Brady: I am grateful to the Secretary of State for his response. Does he accept that within five years the Iranian regime may have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Does not that make it essential for the British Government to give full support to America's steps towards ballistic missile defence?

Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman needs to distinguish carefully between a threat to the United States, which is the current concern of national missile defence, and a threat to the United Kingdom. As I said earlier, we continue to monitor threats from around the world as they might affect the United Kingdom and our allies.

Mr. Lawrie Quinn (Scarborough and Whitby): My right hon. Friend knows of my interest in RAF Fylingdales, which is adjacent to my constituency. The people of Scarborough, Whitby and the north York moors are very interested in who will form the future American Administration. If a President Bush is appointed, many people in my constituency will be concerned about the likely effect on my part of the world, which may become a defence target. What discussions has my right hon. Friend had about the future of RAF Fylingdales in that respect?

Mr. Hoon: The Americans have decided, for the moment at any rate, not to take national missile defence forward, and will not therefore be making any requests of the United Kingdom in relation to Fylingdales or any other facility that might be available until they reach a decision.

Mr. Crispin Blunt (Reigate): The next United States Administration is likely to take ballistic missile defence forward at an early stage. If they do so, will they have the involvement and support of the United Kingdom?

Mr. Hoon: When and if a new Administration is appointed in the United States, and when and if they reach that conclusion, we might well consider it.

House of Commons, Written Questions

27 Nov 2000 : Column: 416W

US National Missile Defence

33. Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what representation he has had, or made to the US Government, on the proposed National Missile Defence system. [138606]

Mr. Hoon: We continue to discuss regularly the proposed US National Missile Defence system with the US Government, and with our other NATO Allies and others.

Blair Visit to Moscow, 21 November 2000

EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, TONY BLAIR, AND PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN, MOSCOW, TESDAY 21 NOVEMBER 2000

QUESTION:
Did you get the chance to discuss matters of defence? The two matters I have in mind are the Missile Defence Programme and European defence. Would you have any concerns if Europe has its own defence force?

PRESIDENT PUTIN:
We did indeed discuss the ABM issue, although not in the same degree of detail that we did in our previous meeting. Russia's position on the ABM issue, namely in favour of maintaining and preserving the ABM Treaty of 1972, has not changed and we do believe that the destruction of that treaty could result in a serious destabilisation of the global situation. But we are prepared to continue our contacts with the US and we are prepared to provide all the arguments needed in support of our position in our contacts with European partners. We are fully prepared to look together for ways to resolve the matter.

As regards the issues of European security, and more specifically a common European defence policy, this is an issue we have discussed today in greater detail. It is with interest that we follow the developments in that area in Europe. Prime Minister Blair has outlined his vision, his philosophy and underlined his approach in this area. This philosophy seeks primarily to maintain everything that is done under this concept of a united Europe, with the purpose of maintaining stability in the continent and the world. We can completely go along with this kind of approach to very sensitive issues and we share the basic principles underlying this new united Europe strategy. What is important here, however, is to ensure that everything that is being done under this concept is transparent and clear. These processes are developing and devolving in Europe, regardless of whether Russia wants it or not. It is not our intention to either interfere with these processes or to encourage them or to provide impetus. We are prepared for joint action and we are prepared to exchange views and to look for agreement and common positions in this area.

PRIME MINISTER:
First of all in respect of national missile defence, we welcome the continued dialogue and that is the right and sensible way to approach this issue. On the issue of common European defence policy, we discussed this in some detail as the President has just made clear. But specifically on the issues raised by parts of the British media this morning, I am used to the British media being impossible on the subject of Europe, but I hope very much that the public will at least be given the facts. One, there is no concept of a European army; two, in respect of each individual mission, this is only when each individual country desires to take part; three, it is for when NATO as a whole is not engaged; and four, it is limited to peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian missions. And of course, as you will know, British troops work alongside the troops of other countries in NATO missions, in UN missions and in Commonwealth missions and it seems sensible for us in the limited circumstances that we have set out, and the British government and the British country decides that it wishes to participate, that we are also able to participate in a European common defence policy.

I think one thing that came out very strongly from the conversation between the President and myself is the common interest we all have in different parts of the world of ensuring stability and order and that where change does take place, change takes place without chaos and disorder.

LOBBY BRIEFING: 11AM MONDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2000

RUSSIA

Asked how the Prime Minister might respond if President Putin asked him to join him in asking the US not to go ahead with National Missile Defence, the PMOS said that one of the reasons why the Russians were particularly interested in us was because they saw us as a bridge between Europe and the US. We would continue to say to the Russians that there had to be constructive dialogue about National Missile Defence. We understood President Putin's concern, but we had to be realistic about the nature of the debate in the US and continue that dialogue with them. Asked the Prime Minister's own view on NMD, the PMOS said that in terms of any decisions which had to be made by Britain, we were some way off having to make them.

House of Commons, Written Questions

16 Nov 2000 : Column: 770W

Ballistic Missile Defence Shield

Mr. Cash: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on American plans for a ballistic missile defence shield designed to protect Western Europe.

Mr. Vaz: President Clinton announced on 1 September that any decision on the possible deployment of a National Missile Defence system would be deferred to the next US Administration.

The system the current administration envisage would protect all of the US, but not Western Europe.

House of Commons, Written Questions

13 Nov 2000 : Column: 509W

Rogue States

Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the potential threat to (a) the United Kingdom and (b) the NATO area by rogue states.

Mr. Vaz: The Government continually reviews, in close consultation with our Allies, potential threats to the United Kingdom and to our NATO Allies from all sources.

House of Lords Written Questions

8 Nov 2000 : Column WA156

Ballistic Missile Defence: UK/US Dialogue

Lord Howell of Guildford asked Her Majesty's Government: What discussions they have held with the government of the United States on ballistic missile defences.[HL4425]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The Government enjoy a regular dialogue with the United States Administration, and with our other allies in NATO, on ballistic missile defence and related issues.

House of Commons Debates

Excerpts from - Defence and the Armed Forces, November 1 - November 2, 2000

1 Nov 2000 : Column 734

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): During the NATO discussions at Birmingham, what discussion took place about the United State's proposal for national missile defence? Did most European countries say that they were opposed to such defence and would not co-operate with it? Did the British Government give a private opinion to the US that they would be prepared to co-operate if a request were made?

Mr. Hoon: There was little discussion of national missile defence at Birmingham, not least because by then the United States had indicated its intention of deferring a decision. As I said to my hon. Friend during Defence questions only the other day, the US having decided to defer the decision, it would be purely speculative for him to suggest that the UK had made any commitment in one direction or another. Unless and until a request is received, he is merely speculating.

Mr. Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green):

1 Nov 2000 : Column 747

The most alarming part of the process is that after the 50 or so years of success of NATO, a British Prime Minister should be leading the process. None of the real lessons from that history has been learned, and all the most dangerous aspects are being applied. The Government's European policy is set to drive us away from the US, which would necessarily be bad for them and for us, affecting the cornerstone for security not just in Europe but globally. The policy is also about the setting up of artificial barriers and a smokescreen, behind which far too many European members of NATO will find an excuse to simply lessen their capabilities and get the Americans off their backs. That is why the Government's actions will not increase or improve capability but are more likely to give an excuse to lessen it.

Evidence of that has already been seen in the Government's position, along with that of the French and German Governments, on ballistic missile defence. That is the most critical issue currently testing NATO and the Government's historical role in binding together the alliance on both sides of the Atlantic and keeping it coherent. Here is a clear, growing threat, and I believe that the Ministry of Defence has told the Secretary of State that it is a reality. I think that it believes that over a period of between five and 10 years, such threats, whether made by terrorists or involving ballistic missiles--which are growing in capability--will be delivered. Only the other day, the Iranians tested a missile that was just short of 1,000 miles in capability, yet that has been consistently dismissed by the Government, in the body of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. These developments are taking place.

The Government have failed to give any lead in Europe for a debate to get together the Americans and the rest of the European allies to discuss how NATO can deal with this growing threat. Instead, there are slanging matches in some of the capitals of Europe, and the Government are sitting on the fence, quietly hoping that the whole thing will go away. It will not.

We are talking about an abrogation of responsibility. The British Government's traditional role is to make sure that we do not allow matters such as these to divide or split the alliance. On two clear counts, the test on the

1 Nov 2000 : Column 748

ballistic missile issue will do that because the Government have seen fit to hide behind their other allies on continental Europe.

In conclusion, the Government's policy, which rests so heavily on the European agenda, will not only divide NATO but damage the peace, potential and future for the rest of the world in a way which, if they had any honesty or sense of shame, they would come to regret.

Mr. Frank Cook (Stockton, North):

1 Nov 2000 : Column 748

I agree with the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) on a couple of points--no more than a couple. First, I agree that we should change the nature of these debates. I have complained about this before. Each year we have these two-day defence debates, which are rather like a bran tub containing a host of issues that we can pick and mix, dip into and throw out. There is no real main theme. The hon. Gentleman has chosen for his two main themes the two hot potatoes of the day. He is right to do so. The first hot potato is ESDP, and the second is national missile defence. I would dearly love there to be proper debates, with specific motions, on those issues.

For a start, a debate on ESDP would enable the demolition of some of the misrepresentative and distorting statements that have been made today. Moreover, my experience a fortnight ago at the space command centre in Colorado Springs indicates that national missile defence can only become an even hotter potato than it is already, as the intention is to replace the static array at Fylingdales with an X-band radar station.

My constituents live near enough to Fylingdales to be worried about that, especially given the strategic approach known as decapitation. The mission statement says that the X-band radar is supposed to protect the 50 states of America, so a serious attack on the United States would take out its defence systems first. Fylingdales would therefore be hit, as would Thule air base in Greenland and Shemya island in the Pacific.

The better informed we become on this matter, the more sensible will be our ultimate decision. The hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green was right to

1 Nov 2000 : Column 749

say that the alliance will be put to a real test, but I think that ESDP is being developed properly, as the right hon. Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith) will confirm. I should like the hon. Gentleman to come to Berlin in a fortnight's time--

Mr. Duncan Smith: I will.

Mr. Cook: Good. The hon. Gentleman will then be able to listen to the debate on these matters in the NATO parliamentary assembly. The picture presented there will be entirely different from that offered to the House this afternoon.

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden): My knowledge of the NATO parliamentary assembly leads me to fear that the hon. Gentleman is giving an incorrect impression. There is considerable criticism and unease about the extent to which the European security and defence identity might interfere with the close relationship that we have always enjoyed with the United States through the NATO alliance.

Mr. Cook: I am grateful for that observation, with which I agree entirely. My point was not that there was no unease in the assembly, but that the views represented there would paint a picture that is totally different from that presented this afternoon. There is a positive quest in the assembly to resolve problems that have been depicted today as set in stone. That depiction is not true.

...

1 Nov 2000 : Column 759

Mr. Campbell: I should like to make a little progress and to deal with national missile defence.

The United States' determination to proceed with national missile defence depends on a flawed assessment of threat. It is true that there are rogue states or states of concern. There are some deeply unpleasant regimes, but we must ask ourselves whether they are so lacking in comprehension that they would threaten to use, or actually use, weapons of mass destruction against the overwhelming nuclear and conventional military superiority of the United States. I simply do not believe that they would. The classic definition of threat is capability plus intention. States of concern might acquire the capability, but it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which they would have the intention of using it because of the extraordinarily damaging, even apocalyptic, consequences of doing so.

Mr. Frank Cook: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that it was the Korean flight of the Taepo Dong II across Japan that gave rise to the hysteria in the United States; and that now, with improved relations between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il recently cemented by Madeleine Albright, that hysteria will fade away?

Mr. Campbell: Traditionally, there were four states of concern. In respect of Iran, we are doing our best to ensure that Mr. Khatami's efforts to modernise that country receive as much encouragement as is helpful to him--but not too much, in case it makes his domestic position difficult. Colonel Gaddafi of Libya has made available the two persons alleged to have committed the Lockerbie bombing. Madeleine Albright has paid a visit to North Korea and I understand that the United Kingdom is about to open an embassy there. As for Iraq, the policy is one of containment and has been for the past 10 years. It strikes me that those four states, often cited as the raison d'etre of national missile defence, do not measure up to the seriousness with which they are apparently regarded by some on Capitol Hill.

Mr. Duncan Smith: Surely, the right hon. and learned Gentleman is approaching the matter from the wrong angle? Two problems remain: first, that those states continue to develop and to obtain such missiles--I mentioned Iran recently testing a missile with a range of about 900 miles; and, secondly, the terrorist threat. However, the real point is that the overwhelming capabilities of NATO show such states that a conventional conflict precludes the possibility of them influencing events, whereas a cheap, simple option is available whereby they use threats to get their way. The west's fear might deliver a different result from the one that was achieved in Kosovo.

Mr. Campbell: The consequence is to destroy the basis on which the nuclear balance has been maintained for the

1 Nov 2000 : Column 760

past 30 or 40 years--deterrence. The anti-ballistic missile treaty was entered into to preserve the principle of deterrence.

It is worth noting that, in the "Joint Vision 2020" document, United States defence planners identified China as a potential threat to US security in the 21st century. Are we expected to believe that, once a so-called limited missile defence has been established to protect the US from states of concern, domestic pressure in the US will not grow to expand it to cover larger missile capabilities? Can the US square the circle by insisting on protection against North Korea, but accepting vulnerability to China?

If the system is deployed in a limited fashion, the case will be made to deploy it far more extensively, which will trigger a response in the form of an increased effort to increase nuclear capability. The Chinese have already made that plain. That would inevitably evoke a response from India, which would, in turn, evoke one from Pakistan. How will the United States profit if global security systems are rejected in favour of competition between states to increase nuclear stockpiles? NMD will neither provide the security for which its supporters hope, nor bring stability and certainty to the rest of us. NMD has a remarkable capacity for damaging relations within NATO, weakening the cohesion of that alliance and dividing Europe from the United States. NMD will undermine the principle of deterrence on which the fragile strategic balance is built at a time when opportunities to achieve an overall reduction in nuclear weapons have never been greater. As Russia encounters increasing economic difficulty in maintaining nuclear weapons, we are presented with an obvious opportunity to negotiate, through a START 3 treaty, far greater reductions on both sides than have previously been envisaged. It would be a great pity if those opportunities were to be given up. Matters are not made easier by the fact that the United States Senate rejected ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty. That decision carries considerable implications--at least in the mind of those in the Duma--regarding the extent to which multilateral nuclear disarmament can be achieved and maintained.

In its recent report on weapons of mass destruction, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs said: it is incumbent on the Government, as one of the five nuclear weapons states and a close ally of the United States, to make an early public statement on its analysis of NMD's likely impact on strategic stability and its assessment of whether this would be in the overall security interests of this country.

I agree--indeed, it might be the only aspect of NMD on which I agree with the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith). The Government must clearly state their position. It is hugely disingenuous to say that, because no request has been made, they have not considered what their answer would be. If that is true, if I may put it flippantly, what the devil are all the people in the nuclear planning group doing at the Ministry of Defence? There is no card game in town other than NMD and its consequences for nuclear policy in its entirety. The Government should have a position on the matter and the debate would be helped by their stating it--at least we would know whether Ministers agreed with me or with

1 Nov 2000 : Column 761

the shadow Defence Secretary. It is a matter of such seriousness that we are entitled to a clear picture of the Government's stance.

Dr. Godman: The right hon. and learned Gentleman mentions the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which am a member. It said that if a new occupant of the White House sought to implement NMD, there would be profound consequences for the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. Our report also pointed out that terrorists--mentioned repeatedly by the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith)--can carry powerful devices in something as small as a suitcase. What can NMD do in that respect?

Mr. Campbell: I remember a briefing from the director of military intelligence when I was a member of the Select Committee on Defence. I believe that the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) was also present. The director produced a flask about four inches high containing about half a pint of liquid: he said that, by putting it in the London water supply, he could get rid of all the people in London. It seems extraordinary to erect a system that will destabilise the balance of deterrence and has the capacity to cause problems with the cohesion of the alliance in the knowledge that something so small that one could put it in one's hip pocket could achieve what one is trying to prevent without there being any question of identification or anything of that sort. NMD is extremely important, and it is high time the Government told us what their position is.

......

Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East):

2 Nov 2000 : Column 894

National missile defence is one of the possible strains on the alliance that loom. A report published in July by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that a United Kingdom refusal to allow the upgrading of Fylingdales would be unprecedented and prove very testing for the alliance.

It "would have profound consequences" for our bilateral relations.

There has been a delay. The policy of Governor Bush is said to represent, possibly, a more ambitious project involving expensive sea-based plans. Is the NMD policy defence industry driven? Will the US listen to the serious concerns that are being expressed in Europe? What--I ask this in the light of the speech made yesterday by the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife--will be the effects on the anti-ballistic missile treaty?

That depends partly on an assessment of whether Russia is prepared to deal, or is absolutist in its opposition to NMD. I know that the right hon. Member for East Devon attended a meeting at which it was suggested that the Russians would try to extract the best deal that they could. The analogy is given of Russian opposition to German reunification until the price is paid. It is a dangerous possibility--and, of course, behind Russia is China. We must ask again whether, given the new rapprochement or at least thaw between the US and North Korea, the perceived threat will be reduced to such an extent that the US will be able to draw certain conclusions about NMD.

Mr. Mike Gapes (Ilford, South):

2 Nov 2000 : Column 905

I would welcome it if the Conservative party became part of that European political co-operation and consensus in trying to make our defence capabilities in Europe more effective. In my opinion, the greatest threat to the future of European defence and to NATO does not come from Europe or any European politician, but from the election platform of the United States Republican party. I suggest that anyone who doubts that goes on to the internet and clicks on the policy positions adopted by the Republicans over the past three or four years, and on the speeches of Condoleeza Rice, who is the senior policy adviser to George W. Bush. I hope that if that party's policy is implemented, sense will prevail among the American electorate or the wiser heads in the State Department and the Defence Department. If they go ahead with ballistic missile defence, they will cause the worst crisis in relations between Europe and the United States that we have seen for more than 20 years.

Mr. Malcolm Savidge (Aberdeen, North):

2 Nov 2000 : Column 917

Like many hon. Members, I follow my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence in paying tribute to the service and sacrifice of our armed forces in such theatres as the Balkans, Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland, where we have been fighting for peace and in defence of human rights and human life. I chose those three theatres because it is pleasing to see that there are better prospects for peace in them. I am sure that the whole House hopes that those prospects will flower.

I am sure, too, that all hon. Members will support the comments of the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch), who paid tribute to the former prisoners of war of the Japanese. We welcome the Government's indication that, at long last, they will receive compensation.

In his speech yesterday, the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), concentrated on two issues that he suggested would split NATO: the European security and defence identity and what he called BMD--ballistic missile defence. The right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) focused on the ESDI; I shall focus on BMD.

I was sorry to miss the speech made yesterday by the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell), because I had to chair a meeting. As ever,

2 Nov 2000 : Column 918

his contribution was impressive and comprehensive. He made eloquently many of the points that I wanted to raise, so I shall abbreviate some of my remarks by referring to his.

The whole House agrees that national missile defence, or BMD, will have a massive influence on Britain. Although that will apply whoever is elected as the US President, there will be differences according to which of the two main candidates is successful. As neither has spelt out a detailed policy on the matter, I deduced what such policies might be. I relied in particular on articles written by their supporters and advisers and on discussions held by an all-party group that visited Washington. We spoke to members of both main parties and to people who held a broad spectrum of views on defence. I made use of a seminar convened by the Heritage Foundation, at which the shadow Secretary of State spoke and which was attended by several Conservative Members.

The rationale for NMD is the perceived threat that rogue states could obtain weapons of mass destruction and the missile delivery systems for them. The Select Committee on Foreign Affairs report records that the consensus of the expert evidence that it received was that both the extent and the immediacy of that threat had been massively hyped in the United States. The Committee suggested that political and commercial interests had perhaps been more important than a strategic, objective assessment. One contribution to the Heritage Foundation seminar seemed to imply that, as it used phrases such as "protect our cities" and "protect our families", appealing to the American frontier spirit--to which the gun lobby also tends to appeal--suggesting that the other party would be "weak on defence", and asking why anyone should object to the system, as it was purely defensive. People who use that last argument are rather like the person who says, "If I go out wearing a flak jacket wherever I go, I am not really being aggressive", and does so while carrying a sub-machine gun. However, I digress.

To return to my main argument, the perception is that the threat from rogue states has been gravely exaggerated--that the United States should not underestimate the enormous deterrent effect of its vast nuclear and conventional forces. As the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife said, even the most unpredictable and ruthless tyrant can have a very strong sense of self-preservation. However, I repeat what I have said previously in this House--that I do not underestimate any of the threats that face us. I realise that there is always a possibility that weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems could fall into the hands of a maniac who was simultaneously genocidal and suicidal.

On the rogue states situation, it must be a source of relief to us all that the political and diplomatic situation has improved to the point where, as a result of the improvement in North Korea and other states, our US allies are talking about "states of concern". The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife enumerated that more fully.

The impression is that the Clinton presidency was perhaps largely pushed on NMD by the political factors that I mentioned earlier. It indicated that a decision on NMD would largely depend on objective criteria--such things as technical feasibility, the perceived threat, effects on arms control and diplomatic relations, and costs. One must assume that a Gore presidency would probably work on the same basis.

2 Nov 2000 : Column 919

I hope that, when the new presidency sees the reduction in the threat by other means, it recognises that even limited national missile defence would have an effect on the anti-ballistic missile treaty, on the nuclear non- proliferation treaty and on arms control generally, and that it assesses the feasibility of such a defence--which ties in with cost, because so far we have had one dubious hit out of three--and reconsiders the whole idea of missile defence.

The failures of the tests so far are one of the reasons that supporters and advisers of Mr. Bush have given for going along with ballistic missile defence--by which they mean something more extensive than NMD--and I believe that that is why the shadow Secretary of State uses that particular phrase. This is a BMD that might be sea-launched, space-based and land-based, and could cover boost-phase, mid-phase and final-phase interception.

The first thing to recognise is that to develop such a system would be a total abrogation of the ABM treaty. Some of those who support such a course of action claim that that treaty no longer exists because the Soviet Union no longer exists. However, we are not talking about only one treaty. It should be remembered that when we reached the agreement, which Britain played a major part in achieving, at the end of the 2000 negotiations on the NNPT, part of what was agreed to by all states present was preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions in offensive weapons.

The Russians--or some Russians--have suggested that there could also be a connection between the ABM treaty and both the strategic arms limitation talks and the strategic arms reduction talks. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Gapes) said, there is a real risk that we could undermine the complete arms control regime.

In a similar vein, even limited nuclear missile defence could have the danger of encouraging Russia to update its nuclear weapons or China to expand its. That would hardly be surprising, because extreme advocates of BMD already argue that it should be used against China. As the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife pointed out, if missile defence were up and running, who is to say that that lobby would not become increasingly vociferous? He also pointed out that if China were to expand its nuclear weapons capability, there would be a grave danger of a knock-on effect on a series of other countries in south-east Asia.

Some extreme exponents of BMD discount Chinese concerns--and the most extreme of them even discount Russian concerns--on the basis that neither country can afford to rival the US if it decides to expand its arsenals. However, the economic destabilisation--or, in one case, the further economic destabilisation--of a major nuclear weapons state is extremely dangerous in itself and must also increase the dangers of the export of nuclear and/or missile technology at state or private criminal level.

Proponents of BMD talk about protecting US cities and families, but some of their rhetoric suggests that they would take a gung-ho adventurist approach to dealing with present or future nuclear weapons states in the confidence that the US had an impenetrable missile shield.

2 Nov 2000 : Column 920

Unless the technology were infallible, those US cities and families--and US allies--might find themselves in greater jeopardy.

I am particularly concerned at the suggestion of boost- phase interception--sea-based or otherwise. That has been proposed not just by the Republican right--the former Defence Secretary, Harold Brown, and others have proposed the same idea in Foreign Affairs. The technical feasibility of firing from a ship is questionable, but it is undoubtedly true that to try to intercept in the less than five minutes of the boost phase is easier because the target is larger, slower, hot and no decoys can be used.

However, missiles would be dispersed around the world and in close proximity nuclear weapon states. The boost phases last less than five minutes, so within how many seconds of suspected detection of the launch of a missile would a decision have to be taken to fire and intercept a missile? At what level of the chain of command would the decision be taken and how many seconds would there be to take it? If an intercept missile were accidentally fired towards a nuclear weapons state and the act were misinterpreted, what would the consequences be? Are we really suggesting that our safety for future centuries could be within a few seconds of such an accident? The sword of Damocles would seem rather safe by comparison.

To try to reduce a comparatively remote threat that can be reduced by other means, our US allies are in danger of increasing far greater threats--regional nuclear war, nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons fired by accident or through misunderstanding--with the horrific possibility of an uncontrolled situation resulting in a holocaust.

The shadow Secretary of State suggested that the Government should lead Europe in discussions with our US allies on this issue. I agree with his suggestion, but I fear that he means that we should lead Europe in trying to persuade everyone to accept unconditionally whatever the US decides. That is not a good way to be an ally. I hope that, whoever becomes American President, the United Kingdom Government will--not necessarily publicly or by megaphone diplomacy--follow the suggestion of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs that we articulate our strong concerns about missile defence and encourage the US to seek other ways of reducing the threats that it perceives to exist. I hope that we shall consider seriously the suggestion made by Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, the UN Under- Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, and which is supported by Kofi Annan. We should think about taking an initiative to get an international conference of all countries, including those nuclear weapons states that do not involve themselves in the present treaty negotiations, on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The issue is of such vital importance that we cannot afford to waste time.

Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood): Now that the WEU is to be amalgamated within the European Union, the institution is coming under close and careful scrutiny. We in the assembly have had various reports, not least from Mr. Richard, the French Defence Minister. The French view, which is important because the French, like us, are a nuclear power and a key element of the defence of our continent, seems to be that article 5 of the Brussels treaty, which is a mutual security guarantee, should remain within the WEU, and so should the role of armaments co-operation.

...

2 Nov 2000 : Column 923

We had a fascinating exchange of views about ballistic missile defence, to which the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Savidge) made a learned contribution, and on the Russian parliamentarians' attitude to Europe's acquiring a strategic identity of its own, with its own common defence policy and, in a sense, its own armed forces under its own control.

House of Commons Written Questions

1 Nov 2000 : Column: 536W

National Missile Defence

Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what his Department's policy is in relation to National Missile Defence. [135044]

Mr. Vaz: I refer the hon. Member to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary's evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee's Inquiry on Weapons of Mass Destruction; and to the Government's response to the Committee's recommendations, which was presented to Parliament on 24 October.

Dr. Julian Lewis: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent discussions he has held with the United States Secretary of State about National Missile Defense.

Mr. Vaz: My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has regularly discussed this issue with a range of US interlocutors, including the US Secretary of State.

House of Commons Oral Questions

Oct. 30 2000 : Column 505

Rogue Governments

Mr. Paul Flynn (Newport, West): What recent assessment he has made of the military threat to the United Kingdom from states with rogue Governments.

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): Our assessment is that there is no significant immediate military threat to the United Kingdom. We continue, however, to monitor the development of military threats very closely.

Mr. Flynn: That is a great relief. If there is no threat to us, what will be our attitude to the phantom threat that is encouraging the United States to introduce a national missile defence system that will entail the upgrading of the radar station at Fylingdales in this country, which we are told is in conflict with the anti-ballistic missile treaty? If George Bush wins the election in America, is not it true that there will be an attempt to introduce that very dangerous national missile system not to secure world peace, but to secure fat contracts for the American arms industry?

Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend has asked that sort of question before, but I should have thought that he would have taken account of the measured approach adopted by President Clinton in stating that he would defer any decision on the deployment of national missile defence. In those circumstances, no request has been made of the United Kingdom and, therefore, much of what he asks me to comment on is mere speculation. However, I can tell him that President Clinton took careful account of the views of the United States's allies, including the United Kingdom.

Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham): Given that the Foreign Office is opposed to ballistic missile defence, what pressure has the Secretary of State received from his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to curtail his Department's involvement in the United Kingdom readiness and risk assessment programme?

Mr. Hoon: Again, Opposition Members need to understand the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility, because the Government speak with a single voice on those matters. I have set out the Government's view precisely. We have had discussions with our US allies. We were delighted that, in announcing his decision to defer any decision in the United States, President Clinton said that he had taken account of those views. We are most grateful.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn), the Defence Secretary said that President Clinton had taken account of the views put forward by allied Governments, including the United Kingdom. Can he tell us exactly what those views were? Will he place those opinions in the Library so that they can be made public? Will he say that, in the event that either future President Gore or future President Bush requests us to endorse national missile defence, with all its dangers and illegalities, the British Government will simply say no?

Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend asks me to speculate on a decision that has not even been taken in the United States and which the US President has recently said does not need to be taken. In those circumstances, he is simply making a request for speculation. A number of issues have to be taken into account. I am delighted that the US President was prepared to take into account the views of allies and said as much. Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend has asked that sort of question before, but I should have thought that he would have taken account of the measured approach adopted by President Clinton in stating that he would defer any decision on the deployment of national missile defence. In those circumstances, no request has been made of the United Kingdom and, therefore, much of what he asks me to comment on is mere speculation. However, I can tell him that President Clinton took careful account of the views of the United States's allies, including the United Kingdom.

Mr. John Bercow (Buckingham): Given that the Foreign Office is opposed to ballistic missile defence,

30 Oct 2000 : Column 506

what pressure has the Secretary of State received from his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to curtail his Department's involvement in the United Kingdom readiness and risk assessment programme?

Mr. Hoon: Again, Opposition Members need to understand the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility, because the Government speak with a single voice on those matters. I have set out the Government's view precisely. We have had discussions with our US allies. We were delighted that, in announcing his decision to defer any decision in the United States, President Clinton said that he had taken account of those views. We are most grateful.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn), the Defence Secretary said that President Clinton had taken account of the views put forward by allied Governments, including the United Kingdom. Can he tell us exactly what those views were? Will he place those opinions in the Library so that they can be made public? Will he say that, in the event that either future President Gore or future President Bush requests us to endorse national missile defence, with all its dangers and illegalities, the British Government will simply say no?

Mr. Hoon: My hon. Friend asks me to speculate on a decision that has not even been taken in the United States and which the US President has recently said does not need to be taken. In those circumstances, he is simply making a request for speculation. A number of issues have to be taken into account. I am delighted that the US President was prepared to take into account the views of allies and said as much.

Mrs. Jacqui Lait (Beckenham): Given that rogue Governments may well use information warfare techniques to pose a military threat to the United Kingdom, and that our information warfare defences will almost certainly include commercially available software, what action does the Secretary of State plan to take following the recent hacking into Microsoft's most secure systems?

Mr. Hoon: The hon. Lady is right to point out that there are, in the modern world, ways in which Governments can be attacked other than by conventional military means. We are aware, across Government, of such threats, and we take every step to develop defences against such potential attacks. As the Microsoft incident shows, there are some ingenious and clever people who are prepared to put their talents at the disposal of the unscrupulous, and we must guard against them, too.

House of Commons Written Questions

Oct. 25 2000 : Column: 149W

Mr. Maude: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent discussions he has had with other Government Departments on (a) the missile threat to Europe and (b) the US Government preparations to pursue national missile defence. [134075]

Mr. Vaz: The relevant Government Departments work very closely together on both these issues.

House of Commons Written Questions

Oct. 25 2000 : Column: 152W

Missile Threat

Mr. Maude: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent discussions he has had with his European Union counterparts regarding the missile threat to Europe. [134078]

Mr. Vaz: The Government are in regular dialogue with its European partners on this and related issues. NATO is the main forum for such discussions.

House of Commons Oral Questions

Oct. 24 2000

Weapons of Mass Destruction

UK Government Response to the Foreign Affairs Committee Report

Released on the 24 October, this Paper is the response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Weapons of Mass Destruction which came out on the 25 July 2000. The original FAC report was heavily critical of NMD and urged the UK Government to resist the US's efforts to include UK sites in the NMD architecture.

In its response the UK Government says;

"The Government has repeatedly made clear that it values the stability which the ABM Treaty provides, and wishes to see it preserved."

and;

"At no point has the Government given the US Administration reason to assume unqualified UK co-operation with NMD deployment: nor has the US Administration at any stage sought any such assurance."

To read the full transcript of the paper please visit the BASIC Website, The original FAC Report can also be found there.

House of Lords Debate

20 Oct 2000 : Column 1318

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

House of Lords, Written Questions

10 Oct 2000 : Column WA29

National Missile Defence Policy

Lord Jenkins of Putney asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether they will refuse to cooperate with the United States government in their National Missile Defence policy.[HL3836]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The US Administration has not asked Her Majesty's Government agreement to make use of facilities in the UK for National Missile Defence purposes. Her Majesty's Government do not expect to receive any such request until and unless President Clinton's successor decides to proceed with the deployment of such a system.

We have made clear that we would give any such request careful consideration in the light of the circumstances in which it was put to us.

Lord Jenkins of Putney asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether they will request the United States government to abandon their National Missile Defence policy on the ground of hostility to the project by and within NATO countries.[HL3837]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Her Majesty's Government have conveyed their views on the possible deployment of a National Missile Defence system to the US Administration in numerous recent bilateral and multilateral discussions, as have other NATO allies.

Our views, and those of other allies, are well understood in Washington--as President Clinton made clear in announcing on 1 September his decision to leave a decision on the deployment of any such system to his successor.

House of Commons, Written Questions

27 Jul 2000 : Column: 747W

Missile Defence System

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 26 June 2000, Official Report, column 409W on the 1985 Memorandum of Understanding relating to Co-operative Research for the Strategic Defence Initiative, what technologies have been subject to information exchange under that initiative. [132568]

Mr. Hoon: The 1985 Memorandum of Understanding allows for exchange of information and research on a wide range of technologies. Most recently these have been in the areas of radar, tracking, countermeasures, lethality, guidance laws and discrimination.

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer, of 27 June 2000, Official Report, column 433W, on the Missile Defence System, what missile defence programmes the United Kingdom is involved in. [132565]

Mr. Hoon: The only Ballistic Missile Defence Programme in the UK is the Technology Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme (TRRAP). The UK is not involved in any US BMD development programmes. The UK is, however, involved in collaborative research and information exchange on the technologies related to Ballistic Missile Defence.

House of Commons, Written Questions

26 Jul 2000 : Column: 676W

Missile Defence System

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, pursuant to his answer of 27 June 2000, Official Report, column 433W, on the Missile Defence System, what criteria the UK will use to determine its response should the United States choose to make a request for assistance in the deployment of a nuclear missile defence system. [132566]

Mr. Hoon: We have made clear we would consider any request carefully in light of the circumstances at the time, taking into account relevant factors including the implications for UK defence. However, we do not yet know whether, or in what circumstances, we might receive such a request, so it is too early to indicate in more detail how or on what basis we might respond.

House of Commons, Statement, G8 Summit

24 Jul 2000 : Column 765

Mr. William Hague (Richmond, Yorks): … The Prime Minister's statement did not refer to missile defence, but newspaper reports suggest that he discussed it with President Putin in connection with North Korea. Has the right hon. Gentleman yet resolved the Government's position on that issue? The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the hon. Member for Neath (Mr. Hain), labels the national missile defence system untested and vulnerable, while the Ministry of Defence has let it be known that it supports it.

Are the reports correct in suggesting that the Prime Minister hinted at unease over the project in discussions with President Putin? Should not the Government be making the case in Europe for working closely with the United States on that issue? Is it not time to make it clear to the United States that Britain would respond positively to any proposal for the upgrade by the United States of Menwith Hill and Fylingdales as part of a United States-NATO ballistic missile defence, should that be necessary? -

The Prime Minister: …On the point about national missile defence, we have made it clear throughout that we understand exactly why the United States is concerned about the possibility of rogue nuclear states. We are trying to ensure that the fear that the United States has--perfectly legitimately and justifiably--is taken account of in a way that does not put at risk the substantial progress that has been made on nuclear disarmament over the past few years. It is vital, therefore, for us to continue a dialogue on what will be one of the most important issues that we shall have to face over the next few years.

House of Lords, Oral Questions

13 Jul 2000 : Column 370

US Nuclear Defence System Proposal

3.23 p.m.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether they consider that upgrading early warning radar sites in the United Kingdom to support the proposed United States nuclear missile defence system would break the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, the United States recognise that changes to the terms of the ABM Treaty would be required to enable them to deploy the sort of national missile defence system currently envisaged without breaching that treaty. That is why it is seeking to negotiate such changes with Russia. The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence recently submitted a memorandum on the subject to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, which has now put it in the public domain via the Internet. I shall therefore now be able to place a copy in the Library of the House.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that encouraging reply. Does she recognise that at the present stage of debate in the United States, where people are much less determined to go ahead than they were some months ago, the views of America's allies will carry great weight? Will she assure us that Her Majesty's Government intend making their views known about a system that will require British co-operation if it is to go into service as designed?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, I assure the noble Lord and the House that our views on NMD have been conveyed clearly to the United States in bilateral exchanges and in discussions in NATO on many occasions. The debate involves important security concerns on all sides. We believe that they need to be considered and addressed seriously. Russia has now acknowledged that there is a growing threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and that that threat must be addressed. It is essential that the issue is taken forward on the basis of dialogue and negotiation. Public confrontation will hinder, not help, the search for an agreed way forward.

Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, safety from nuclear missiles is indivisible. Either the whole world is safe or no one is safe. If Russia is goaded into abandoning her arms control programme, it will make America a more dangerous place in which to live, not a safer one.

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, it is in nobody's interests nor is it anyone's intention to goad Russia into anything of the sort. That is why the Americans are engaged in ongoing negotiations with the Russians, with our full support and encouragement, to try to find a way forward.

Lord Howell of Guildford: My Lords, does the Minister accept that, despite the failure of the booster rocket in the test at the weekend, if these exoatmospheric killer vehicles can be made to work, they will help to reinforce world safety by reducing people's readiness to resort to nuclear weapons? Will she reassure us that the British Government take a rather more positive view of the issue than, for example, the French Government? As the decision has to be made in two weeks in Washington on whether the programme will go ahead under the current President and as British participation is necessary for that decision, because of the high-resolution radar at Fylingdales and the infra-red tracking facility at Menwith Hill, will she reassure us that the British Government are also ready to take the necessary decision in the next few weeks? Will she ensure that we are fully informed when the Government take that decision?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, I assure the noble Lord that the House will be fully informed if any such decisions are taken. However, I caution against believing the reports, which I have also read, that decisions are about to be taken in the next week or two. I think that our information is accurate. Our understanding is that no decision on NMD will be taken in the United States until towards the end of this year. Many noble Lords will have seen the article in last Sunday's Observer stating that a decision would be taken at a meeting on Tuesday. That is not the case. There are many meetings taking place, as one would expect. The United States' decision on whether to proceed with NMD deployment will be taken by the President alone. I repeat that we do not expect any decision from him until later this year at the earliest.

Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords--

Lord Carver: My Lords--

The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Jay of Paddington): My Lords, I think that we probably have time for two more questions. I believe that the House is inviting a contribution from the Cross Benches.

Lord Carver: My Lords, after the failure of the second trial the other day, will the Government try to persuade the United States Government to abandon this irrelevant project and switch their efforts to theatre missile defence, which would not be in breach of the ABM treaty and would be much more relevant to the needs of NATO?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, no doubt the outcome of the latest test will have a bearing on the United States' assessment as regards the decision to be made on the technological feasibility of proceeding to deploy an NMD system at this point. But plainly, as the noble and gallant Lord will understand better than most, one cannot judge the feasibility of such a complex system on the basis of one test. Many more tests have always been planned before any NMD system becomes operational.

Judgments on the technical progress of the programme are for the United States to make. In the meantime, as I said, we continue to discuss the wider issues raised by missile defence with the US Administration, both bilaterally and in NATO.

Baroness Williams of Crosby: My Lords, may we take it from what the Minister said that she will now encourage much wider public debate, which has not so far taken place to any great extent in this country, especially given our very powerful negotiating position here? Does she agree that there is a real danger that the opening up of a much more extensive system of disarmament, with the full support of both Russia and China, depends largely on how this issue is handled over the next few months?

Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale: My Lords, yes. I can only repeat some of my earlier remarks. We are using every diplomatic means to make known our views to our allies and to those who are not always necessarily our allies on this issue. It is of vital importance to the whole world that we find a proper way forward.

House of Commons, Written Questions

Ballistic Missile Threat

Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the threat of attack on the UK by missiles launched from (a) Iran, (b) Iraq, (c) North Korea and (d) other states. [130019]

12 Jul 2000 : Column: 543W

Mr. Vaz: Our current assessment is that there is no significant ballistic missile threat to the UK at present.

We continue to monitor developments in this area closely.

House of Lords, Written Questions

10 Jul 2000 : Column WA2

US National Missile Defence System

Lord Judd asked Her Majesty's Government: What is their latest evaluation of the technical feasibility and expense of a United States National Missile Defence System. [HL3063]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: We continue to discuss with the US many aspects of their possible National Missile Defence system. But we have made no formal assessment of the technical feasibility or cost to the United States of such a system. The US has made clear that these are two of the factors that the President will consider in deciding whether to proceed with the deployment of any such system.

Missile and Terrorist Attack: Threat Reduction

Lord Judd asked Her Majesty's Government: What studies they are making of the relative future likelihood of missile attack or terrorist attack on the United Kindom and its major allies; and what global policies they believe are necessary to reduce the prospect of either. [HL3066]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: These potential threats to the United Kingdom are kept under constant review. The UK is an active participant in the international discussions on reducing the threats posed by both of these issues.

House of Commons, Defence Oral Questions

3 Jul 2000 : Column 1

Missile Defence System

1. Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): What recent representations he has received on the proposed US national missile defence system and its effects on the UK. [127255]

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): We have received a number of representations recently on the proposed US national missile defence system. The United States President has not yet decided whether to begin deployment of the proposed system. We would not expect a request for the use of facilities in the United Kingdom until after any such decision has been made. We have made it clear that we would consider such a request carefully in the light of circumstances at the time, including the implications for the defence of the UK.

Mr. Corbyn: May I ask the Secretary of State to cast his mind back to May, when the five declared nuclear powers - all of whom are permanent members of the Security Council - stated as their long-term aim the global elimination of nuclear weapons and total disarmament? Does he not think that the American proposal for a national missile defence system, with outlying stations based in the Pacific ocean and the UK, is not only an escalation of the danger of nuclear conflict, but flies in the face of the non-proliferation treaty? Instead of waiting for what President Clinton may or may not decide on Friday, on the basis of whatever tests are going forward, should we not say--here and now--that we shall have no part in any global extension of nuclear weapons or nuclear missile defence systems, but that we shall work wholeheartedly for worldwide nuclear disarmament? Does he not think that the proposed siting at Fylingdales in Yorkshire turns this country, once again, into a nuclear aircraft carrier for the US?

Mr. Hoon: No, he does not. My hon. Friend is getting rather ahead of events. As yet, there is no US proposal as such. The US has not taken a decision and has not made any formal request to the UK. In those circumstances, I do not need to answer his question about Fylingdales.

Mr. David Atkinson (Bournemouth, East): Is the right hon. Gentleman clear about the nature of the long-term threats that motivated the US Congress to pass its national missile defence Act? Does he consider that such threats might apply also to this country and to Europe? Is he aware that the technological and aerospace committee of the Western European Union, together with his hon. Friends the Members for Leigh (Mr. Cunliffe) and for Sunderland, North (Mr. Etherington) and myself, is visiting the US in two weeks' time precisely to investigate those issues and to report back to the Assembly?

Mr. Hoon: The UK recognises US concerns about the threat--specifically that posed in the short term by North Korea. That is why there is a differential reaction in Europe. Inevitably, North Korea could not threaten Europe in the short term. Our current assessment is that there is no significant threat to the UK from weapons of mass destruction. However, I must emphasise that we continue to monitor developments closely. Obviously,we must have regard to the protection of UK interests should such a threat emerge.

Mr. Paul Flynn (Newport, West): Does the Secretary of State really believe that there is a serious threat to Seattle from North Korea, when North Korea has trouble with the missiles it has targeted on South Korea? At this time of rapprochement, does that not mean that what is going on is not a perceived threat, but the perceived greed of the American defence industry, which wants to make more profits from a new arms race which will impoverish the planet even more and put us in great danger? The Secretary of State said that he had received no formal approach from the US. What approaches has he received?

Mr. Hoon: I do not accept the way in which my hon. Friend puts his question. It is not for the UK to make assessments of the degree of threat perceived by the US, but there is a widespread recognition that North Korea is developing a capability that would undoubtedly pose a threat to the US. As for our position, it remains that we do not identify a current threat to the UK. However, it is important both that we monitor the situation and that we ensure that the UK's interests are properly protected.

Mr. Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green): I have some sympathy for the Secretary of State--I hope that he will accept that remark in the spirit in which it was meant. On one side of him are the US Government and his own Ministry of Defence, who tell him that there is a serious threat and a need to show some leadership on the matter because of the threat from rogue states. On the other side are his own Foreign Office, led by the two CND supremos, his right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of State, the hon. Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Vaz), and the French Government who are utterly opposed to the proposal. Now we hear that most of his Back Benchers give him no support either. Do we not have the right to expect Her Majesty's Government to show some leadership in this matter--as they would traditionally have done--and to make up their minds? Instead of that, they twist and turn, leaving us with one simple policy, Mr. Micawber's view--they hope something will turn up.

Mr. Hoon: I anticipate that my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) would take as a criticism the statement that he represented the majority of Labour Back Benchers. Let me make it clear that the Government continue to monitor carefully developments of the situation. As yet, there have been no specific or formal requests from the US. There is no division of opinion in the Government on our approach to such matters. It is vital that we should give support to the US, if necessary, while recognising--as the US has done--that it is for the international community to decide on these matters and to make its views known to the US before any decision is taken to deploy.

House of Commons, Written Questions

3 Jul 2000 : Column: 55W

Missile Defence System

31. Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent representations he has made to the USA and NATO on the proposed new missile defence system. [127287]

Mr. Hoon: We have a continuing dialogue with the US Administration on their proposed National Missile Defence system. It also continues to be the subject of collective discussion by NATO Allies.

House of Commons, Written Questions

27 Jun 2000 : Column: 433W

Missile Defence System

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) what criteria the Government will employ in making a decision on the deployment of a national missile defence system; [126947]

(2) if the results of his Department's Technology, Readiness and Risk Assessment programme will be available before a decision is taken on whether to allow UK facilities to be used in a US national missile defence system; [126949]

(3) on what basis a decision will be made on whether to allow the USA to upgrade the facilities at Fylingdales for a national missile defence system; [126948]

(4) what recent discussions there have been between the UK and the USA regarding options for locating anti-ballistic missile sites in the UK; [126942]

(5) what assessment he has (a) made recently and (b) plans to make of the impact of a national missile defence system on the security of the UK. [126946]

Mr. Hoon: We have discussed, and continue to discuss, a range of aspects of possible proposals for a US National Missile Defence system with the United States. The US has not asked for UK assistance in the deployment of the proposed system, nor would we expect them to do so until after a US decision on whether to proceed with its deployment. In discussions with the US Administration we have made it clear that the UK would consider any such request carefully, taking into account a wide range of factors, including the implications for UK defence.

The MOD's Technology Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme is due to be completed next summer. I refer my hon. Friend to the answer I gave to the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) on 12 June 2000, Official Report, column 451W.

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if NATO has (a) carried out and (b) is undertaking research into ballistic missile defences. [126938]

Mr. Hoon: We are not aware of any research carried out or being undertaken by NATO into ballistic missile defences. The Ministry of Defence has, however, contributed to NATO studies on the subject, including preparations for studies into the feasibility of theatre ballistic missile defence. We expect these studies to start next year.

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what discussions have taken place between the UK and the USA on sea-based ballistic missile defences. [126945]

Mr. Hoon: The UK is not directly involved in the US sea-based Theatre Missile Defence programme but limited information exchange and collaborative research has been undertaken.

House of Commons, Written Questions

27 Jun 2000 : Column: 436W

US Airborne Laser

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what (a) information exchange and (b) co-operation there has been between his Department and the US (i) Department of Defense and (ii) State Department concerning the US Airborne Laser. [126944]

Mr. Hoon: The Ministry of Defence has received limited information from the Department of Defense on the US Airborne Laser programme. There has been no discussion or co-operation on this matter between the MOD and the Department of State.

House of Commons, Written Questions

26 Jun 2000 : Column: 409W

Ballistic Missile Defence

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library a list of agreements on information exchange between the UK and USA with regard to anti-ballistic missile systems. [126943]

Mr. Hoon: The 1985 Memorandum of Understanding relating to Co-operative Research for the Strategic Defence Initiative is the sole agreement which provides the basis for information exchange between the UK and USA with regard to Ballistic Missile Defence.

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent expenditure there has been by DERA on research into and evaluation of anti-ballistic missile systems. [126950]

Mr. Hoon: The recent research by DERA in the area of BMD has resulted from the MOD sponsored and funded study known as the Technology Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme (TRRAP). The three-year programme was begun in July 1998 at a cost of £12.5 million. Approximately 55 per cent. of the funds have been allocated to DERA with the balance allocated to UK industry.

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) if Field Marshal Sergeyev of the Russian Federation discussed ballistic missile defences at the meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council on 9 June; and if he will publish the minutes of that meeting; [126941]

(2) what discussions have taken place between his Department and representatives of the Russian Federation concerning ballistic missile defences; and if he will publish the minutes of the meetings. [126940]

Mr. Hoon: The Government have discussed issues relating to the possible proposals for a US National Missile Defence system, and ballistic missile defence more generally, in the course of regular consultations with representatives of the Russian Federation on security- related issues. Most recently, the Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev presented in outline a Russian proposal on ballistic missile defence to NATO Defence Ministers in the NATO/Russia Permanent Joint Council on 9 June.

I am withholding records of these meetings under exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.

26 Jun 2000 : Column: 410W

Ballistic Missile Proliferation

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what recent assessment NATO has made regarding the nature of the threat from ballistic missile proliferation. [126939]

Mr. Hoon: NATO prepares periodic classified assessments of threats to Alliance interests including those presented by ballistic missile proliferation.

House of Commons, Written Questions

26 Jun 2000 : Column: 402W

US National Missile Defence

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what bilateral discussions with (a) Canada and (b) Denmark there have been on developing criteria for the formulation of a decision on National Missile Defence. [126957]

Mr. Vaz: We have had a number of discussions with the Canadian and Danish Governments--both bilaterally, and in NATO--on US National Missile Defence plans.

These discussions have not included the development of criteria for a decision on National Missile Defence. It is for the United States to decide whether or not to proceed with deployment of a US National Missile Defence system. The US Administration have said that such a decision would be made by the President on the basis of four criteria, namely: the threat; costs; technological feasibility; and wider international implications, including for arms control.

House of Commons, Written Questions

26 Jun 2000 : Column: 409W

Technology, Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme

Ann Clwyd: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what are the 2001 budget and staffing levels for the ballistic missile defence component of the Technology, Readiness and Risk Assessment programme. [126951]

Mr. Hoon: The Technology Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme is a three-year programme begun in July 1998. £12.5 million has been allocated for the overall programme, the work for which is being shared between the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA) and four UK defence contractors. The wide-ranging and consultative nature of the programme means that it is not possible to provide precise details of staffing levels, but the core team comprises 25-30 staff.

House of Commons, Written Questions

19 Jun 2000 : Column: 20W

European ABM System

Mr. Maude: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what recent representations he has received from (a) his European counterparts, (b) the US Government and (c) the Russian Government regarding the Russian proposal for creating a pan-European ABM system. [126606]

Mr. Vaz: The Russian Defence Minister, Igor Sergeyev, presented Russia's proposal in outline to NATO Defence Ministers in the NATO/Russia Permanent Joint Council on 9 June.

On the basis of that presentation, NATO Permanent Representatives have had an initial discussion of the Russian proposal. Officials have also separately had preliminary bilateral discussions about the proposal with a number of NATO Allies, including the United States.

House of Commons, Written Questions

13 Jun 2000 : Column: 567W

National Missile Defence System

Miss McIntosh: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he has made of (a) the cost and (b) the length of time required to upgrade RAF Fylingdales in the event of a request from the United States for United Kingdom assistance in the deployment of the proposed National Missile Defence System. [125077]

Mr. Hoon: We have not received a request from the US regarding the use of any facilities in the UK as part of the proposed US National Missile Defence system. Nor would we expect one until after a US decision to proceed with deployment of the proposed system. We would consider such a request carefully, taking into account a wide range of factors, including a detailed assessment of the proposed nature and duration of any works requested. The question of financial costs associated with proceeding with deployment of the proposed US National Missile Defence system is first and foremost a matter for the US.

House of Commons, Written Questions

12 Jun 2000 : Column: 451W

Ballistic Missile Defence

Mr. Duncan Smith: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the programme of work that is being undertaken by his Department in relation to ballistic missile defence. [125009]

Mr. Hoon [holding answer 8 June 2000]: Following the policy on ballistic missile defence set out in the Strategic Defence Review, the Ministry of Defence is undertaking a three-year programme of studies known as the Technology Readiness and Risk Assessment Programme. This programme is monitoring developments in the risks posed by ballistic missiles and in the technology to counter them. It is due to be completed next summer. The terms of reference for the programme were announced on 27 July 1999, Official Report, column 203W. In addition, we are contributing to NATO preparations for studies into the feasibility of theatre ballistic missile defence. We expect these studies to start next year.

House of Lords, Written Questions

5 Jun 2000

National Missile Defence Policy

Lord Jenkins of Putney asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether they will refuse to cooperate with the United States government in their National Missile Defence policy.[HL3836]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: The US Administration has not asked Her Majesty's Government agreement to make use of facilities in the UK for National Missile Defence purposes. Her Majesty's Government do not expect to receive any such request until and unless President Clinton's successor decides to proceed with the deployment of such a system. We have made clear that we would give any such request careful consideration in the light of the circumstances in which it was put to us.

Lord Jenkins of Putney asked Her Majesty's Government: Whether they will request the United States government to abandon their National Missile Defence policy on the ground of hostility to the project by and within NATO countries.[HL3837]

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Her Majesty's Government have conveyed their views on the possible deployment of a National Missile Defence system to the US Administration in numerous recent bilateral and multilateral discussions, as have other NATO allies. Our views, and those of other allies, are well understood in Washington--as President Clinton made clear in announcing on 1 September his decision to leave a decision on the deployment of any such system to his successor.

House of Commons, Defence Oral Questions

5 Jun 2000 : Column 5

RAF Fylingdales

4. Mr. Norman Baker (Lewes): If he will make a statement about the purpose of RAF Fylingdales. [122642]

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): RAF Fylingdales provides the United Kingdom with early warning of potential ballistic missile attack against the United Kingdom and western Europe, and the United States with early warning for north America. It has performed that function since 1963.

Mr. Baker: Does the Minister agree that many people believe it to be foolish and dangerous to allow RAF Fylingdales to be used to make the UK a sitting target by basing a national missile defence system there that will protect US but not UK airspace? Why does he say that the anti-ballistic missile treaty is solely a matter for the parties who have signed it? If UK land is to be used to break that treaty, surely it is a matter for him. Will he confirm that the decision to allow the deployment of the national missile defence system at Fylingdales is a matter for him, and not for the US Government? Will he rule out that deployment today? If not, will he give us a date when the decision will be taken?

Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman makes a considerable number of points, some of which, I regret to have to tell him, are quite wrong. I will not go through them in detail, save to say that, clearly, if two parties are signatories to a treaty, it is for them, and not any other nation, to interpret it. He is right to this extent: it is for the United Kingdom to decide what should happen at RAF Fylingdales. As yet, there has been no specific request for the use of those facilities from the US, not least because it has made no decision about whether to deploy national missile defence.

Miss Anne McIntosh (Vale of York): Will the Secretary of State confirm that, if such a request is made, RAF Fylingdales will have to be upgraded to perform that role?

Mr. Hoon: If such a decision were made by the President of the United States and if, as a result of that decision, a request were made to the United Kingdom for the use of RAF Fylingdales, yes, the facilities would have to be upgraded.

House of Lords, Written Questions

5 Jun 2000 : Column WA128

RAF Menwith Hill

Lord Avebury asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether they will place in the Library of the House the contractual or other documents relating to the occupation of land known as RAF Menwith Hill by third parties.[HL2469]

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: As with all sites made available for use by the United States visiting forces in the United Kingdom, RAF Menwith Hill is made available in accordance with the NATO Status of Forces Agreement of 1951, a copy of which has been placed in the Library of the House, and other arrangements appropriate to the relationship which exists between the Government of the United Kingdom and United States for the purposes of our common defence. These other arrangements are confidential and are withheld under exemption 1 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.

There are also four grazing licences let over RAF Menwith Hill, in accordance with departmental policy to use the defence estate in the most efficient and economical way practicable. We consider these to contain commercially confidential information and to be private between the Ministry of Defence and the individuals concerned. I am withholding these documents under exemption 13 of the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information.

Nicola Butler
The Acronym Institute
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